Ethics of Mind (Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades)
Internally funded project
Start date : 31.10.2015
End date : 30.09.2019
Project details
Short description
The dissertation argues for a solution of the problem of mental responsibility and normtivity: How can we be responsible for what we belief, desire, feel, and intend, if we have no direct control over these mental states? And how can there be norms for mental states under these circumstances? It is argued that alternative approaches fail, which claim that we have direct control over our mind or that our mental responsibility and normativity can be explained without reference to control. Rather, the dissertation defends the approach that mental responsibility and normativity is fully explicable in terms of indirect control over our mind through our actions. The conception of normativiy behind this is that substantive normativity originates from our actions, and that genuin mental normativity of intentional mental states does not exist.
Scientific Abstract
The dissertation argues for a solution of the problem of mental responsibility and normtivity: How can we be responsible for what we belief, desire, feel, and intend, if we have no direct control over these mental states? And how can there be norms for mental states under these circumstances? It is argued that alternative approaches fail, which claim that we have direct control over our mind or that our mental responsibility and normativity can be explained without reference to control. Rather, the dissertation defends the approach that mental responsibility and normativity is fully explicable in terms of indirect control over our mind through our actions. The conception of normativiy behind this is that substantive normativity originates from our actions, and that genuin mental normativity of intentional mental states does not exist.
