List Price Collusion
Boshoff WH, Paha J (2021)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2021
Journal
Book Volume: 21
Pages Range: 393-409
Journal Issue: 3
DOI: 10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
Abstract
Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices—even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.
Authors with CRIS profile
Involved external institutions
University of Stellenbosch / Universiteit van Stellenbosch
South Africa (ZA)
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen
Germany (DE)
South Africa (ZA)
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen
Germany (DE)
How to cite
APA:
Boshoff, W.H., & Paha, J. (2021). List Price Collusion. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21(3), 393-409. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
MLA:
Boshoff, Willem H., and Johannes Paha. "List Price Collusion." Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 21.3 (2021): 393-409.
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